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The V L value for network games
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Abstract
In this paper we consider a proper Shapley value (the V L value) for co-
operative network games. This value turns out to have a nice interpretation.
We compute the V L value for various kinds of networks and relate this value
to optimal strategies in an associated matrix game.
Key words: undirected graph, network game, proper Shapley value, matrix game,
optimal strategy
JEL classification number: C71
1 Introduction
Van den Brink et al. (2005) study symmetric networks (undirected graphs) by means
of associated network games. In a network game, the value of a coalition of nodes
represents its “control” in the network. The Shapley value of such a game then
reflects in some sense the relative power of the nodes in the network. Van den Brink
et al. (2005) characterise this value in terms of the underlying graph.
Vorob’ev and Liapounov (1998) introduce the concept of proper Shapley value. A
proper Shapley value of a transferable utility game is defined as a fixed point of the
so-called corresponding Shapley mapping. They furthermore provide a constrained
maximisation problem, whose unique solution (henceforth, the V L value) is shown
to be a proper Shapley value.
In this paper, we consider the V L value of network games. We examine the V L
maximisation problem in terms of the underlying graph rather than the associated
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game. The shape of the graph gives some clues about what the V L value looks like.
For some special classes of graphs, we provide a full description of the V L value.
Instead of taking an axiomatic approach, as is done in Van den Brink et al. (2005),
we focus on the interpretation of the V L maximisation problem and hence, of the
V L value. We argue that the V L value can be seen as an optimal resource allocation
in the graph when one wants to find a hidden substance in each of the nodes and
the probability of finding this substance in a particular node is proportional to the
amount of resources in this and all adjacent nodes.
When the object to be found in the graph is hidden in just one single node in
such a way as to minimise the probability of finding it, another resource allocation
problem arises. We present this non-cooperative problem in terms of an associated
matrix game and show that for some classes of graphs, the two search problems have
the same solution.
This paper is organised as follows. In section 2, we define some basic notions of
networks, network games and proper Shapley values. The V L value is defined and
analysed for various types of graphs in section 3. The interpretation of the V L value
in terms of search problems is the subject of section 4, while section 5 deals with
the associated matrix games.
2 Network games
In this section we first discuss some graph and game theoretic preliminaries before
defining network games. A (symmetric) network or undirected graph is a pair (N, G),
where N = {1, . . . , n} is a set of nodes and G ⊂ {{i, j}|i, j ∈ N, i 6= j} is a set of
edges, or links, between these nodes. Note that we restrict ourselves to irreflexive
graphs, ie, (i, i) /∈ G for all i ∈ N . When no confusion arises, we represent the graph
(N, G) by G.
We restrict ourselves to connected networks, ie, we assume that for every pair of
nodes i, j ∈ N, i 6= j, there exists a sequence h1, . . . , hp such that h1 = i, hp = j,
and {hk, hk+1} ∈ G for all k ∈ {1, . . . , p − 1}. We denote the class of all connected
networks on N by GN .
If {i, j} ∈ G or i = j, then nodes i and j are called relatives1. By RG(i) we
1Van den Brink et al. (2005) allow for loops to be part of the graph and consequently have a
different notion of relative.
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denote the set of all relatives of node i ∈ N in network G, ie, RG(i) = {i} ∪ {j ∈
N | {i, j} ∈ G}. For a set S ⊂ N of nodes we denote RG(S) =
⋃
i∈S RG(i). A
pending node is a node with exactly two relatives.
A cooperative game with transferable utility (or simply TU game) is a pair (N, v)
(again, often represented by v) with player set N = {1, . . . , n} and characteristic
function v : 2N → R satisfying v(∅) = 0.
For every coalition T ⊂ N, T 6= ∅, the unanimity game uT is defined by uT (S) = 1
if S ⊂ T and uT (S) = 0 otherwise. The class of unanimity games constitutes a basis





where the coefficients, called dividends, are defined by ∆v(S) = v(S) if |S| = 1 and
recursively ∆v(S) = v(S) −
∑
T$S ∆v(T ) if |S| ≥ 2.
A solution on a class C of TU games is a function f : C → RN , assigning an
allocation f(v) ∈ RN to every v ∈ C. A well-known solution on the class of all TU
games is the Shapley value (cf. Shapley (1953)), which for each coalition S ⊂ N








Given a system of positive weights ω ∈ {x ∈ RN | ∀i∈N : xi > 0}, the weighted






∆v(S) for all i ∈ N ,
where ω(S) =
∑
i∈S ωi. Clearly, we obtain the Shapley value by taking equal weights.
Of course, given a weight system ω, we get the same weighted Shapley value if we
normalise the weights such that they add to one. Hence, we only consider weight
systems taken from the unit simplex SN = {x ∈ RN | ∀i∈N : xi ≥ 0,
∑
i∈N xi = 1}.
Vorob’ev and Liapounov (1998) extend the definition of Φv to the whole unit sim-
plex (and not just its interior) by taking its closure. The mapping Φv : SN → RN
that assigns to every weight system ω ∈ SN the weighted Shapley value Φv(ω) of
game v is called the Shapley mapping of game v. For a game v with nonnegative
dividends and v(N) = 1, a fixed point of the Shapley mapping, ie, a vector ω ∈ SN
such that Φv(ω) = ω, is a proper Shapley value (cf. Vorob’ev and Liapounov (1998)).
Van den Brink et al. (2005) define for each network (N, G) an associated conserv-
ative network power game (henceforth network game) (N, vG), where we identify the
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nodes as players and the characteristic function (expressed in terms of our frame-
work) is given by
vG(S) = |{i ∈ RG(S) |RG(i) ⊂ S}|
for all S ⊂ N . That is, the worth of a coalition S of players equals the number of
relatives of S that have no relatives outside S. The idea behind this network game is
that it in some sense measures the “power” of the nodes in the network (cf. Van den
Brink et al. (2005)). Because in our framework i ∈ RG(i) for all i ∈ N , only players
inside S can be involved:
vG(S) = |{i ∈ S |RG(i) ⊂ S}|.
From the recursive formula for the dividends it is readily seen that
∆vG(S) = |{i ∈ S |RG(i) = S}|













3 The V L value for network games
Vorob’ev and Liapounov (1998) show that one particular proper Shapley value of v










In this section, we are going to consider this maximisation problem for network
games. Each network game has nonnegative dividends, so the V L value of its 1-
normalisation2 is well-defined. Because vG(N) = n for each G ∈ G
N , we can consider
the maximisation problem without first normalising the game and still compare the
2The 1-normalisation w of a game v with v(N) 6= 0 is defined by w(S) = v(S)
v(N) for all S ⊂ N .
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results (which with slight abuse of terminology we refer to as V L values) across
various networks on the same set of players.












such that yi =
∑
j∈RG(i)
xj for all i ∈ N,
∑
j∈N xj = 1,
xj ≥ 0 for all j ∈ N.
(3.1)
Throughout the remainder, we use the vectors x and y as in program (3.1). If n = 1
or n = 2, then clearly every x is optimal, so from now on, assume n ≥ 3. By taking
x = ( 1
n
, . . . , 1
n
), we immediately conclude that the optimal value of (3.1), as well as
the corresponding values for y, are positive.
In general, solving (3.1) can be quite complicated, depending on the form of the
graph G. One obvious first step in finding the solution is presented in the following
lemma.
Lemma 3.1 Let i ∈ N be a pending node in network G. Then it can never be
optimal to have xi > 0.
Proof: The single node j ∈ RG(i)\{i} must have at least two relatives, because G
is connected and n ≥ 3. Let x ∈ SN be such that xi > 0, then x
′ given by x′i = 0,
x′j = xj + xi and x
′
k = xk for all other k ∈ N , gives an improvement, since it weakly
increases yk for all k ∈ RG(j)\{i, j}, at least one of them strictly, while otherwise
leaving y unchanged. 
We are going to solve the maximisation program (3.1) for some special classes of
networks. Clearly, the value f(G) of the program (3.1) is positive and cannot be
greater than one. This upper bound is obtained for networks that have a central
node that is directly connected to all other nodes.
Proposition 3.2 For every G ∈ GN it holds that f(G) ≤ 1. Moreover, f(G) = 1 if
and only if there exists a node i ∈ N such that RG(i) = N .
Proof: It is obvious that f(G) ≤ 1. First, assume that RG(i) = N for some i ∈ N .
Take x ∈ SN such that xi = 1 and xj = 0 for all j ∈ N\{i}. Since i ∈ RG(j) for all
5
j ∈ N , yj = 1 for all j ∈ N and f(G) = 1.
Next, assume that G is such that there is no i ∈ N such that RG(i) = N . Let
x ∈ SN and let i ∈ N be such that xi > 0. Take j ∈ N\RG(i), which is possible by
assumption. Then yj ≤ 1 − xi < 1 and consequently, the objective value is smaller
than 1. Since this holds for all x ∈ SN , f(G) < 1. 
In particular the maximal value f(G) is obtained for a star network, ie, a network
G such that there is an i ∈ N with RG(i) = N and RG(j) = {i, j} for all j ∈ N\{i}.
Also, f(G) = 1 if G is the complete graph: {{i, j} | i, j ∈ N, i 6= j}.
j j j j j1 2 3 4 5
Figure 1: Line network
Next, we consider the case of a line, defined as a network G consisting of the edges
{{i, i + 1} | i ∈ {1, n− 1}}, as depicted for n = 5 in Figure 1. Using Lemma 3.1, an
optimal x must satisfy x1 = xn = 0. For all other i, the variable xi contributes to
three of the coordinates of y, and we conclude that in the optimum we must have
∑
i∈N
yi = 3. (3.2)
Hence, the arithmetic mean of the variables yi must be equal to 3/n. By a well-
known inequality, the geometric mean cannot be greater than this. But our objective
function is precisely the n-th power of the geometric mean, so for our program we






Note, however, that this is an upper bound, not necessarily the maximum. To obtain
this upper bound, all of the variables yi (not just their arithmetic mean) must be
equal to 3/n. This cannot always be done, as is easily checked by considering the








will clearly do the job. In fact, this can be done whenever n is a multiple of 3. For,





if i ≡ 2,
0 if i ≡ 0, 1,
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where all equivalences ≡ are mod 3. It is easily checked that this will give the desired
value 3
n
for each coordinate of y.
For other n (ie, not multiples of 3), the situation is slightly more complicated.
First, we consider the case n ≡ 1, so let n = 3q + 1 with q ∈ N. Given (3.2) and
because
∑
i∈N :i≡1 yi =
∑
i∈N xi = 1, the following program is a relaxation of (3.1)
for this line (ie, this program provides an upper bound for the original program and






i∈N :i≡1 yi = 1,
∑
i∈N :i≡0,2 yi = 2,
yi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N.




if i ≡ 1,
1
q
if i ≡ 0, 2.






j∈N :|i−j|≤1 xj for all i ∈ N,
∑
j∈N xj = 1,
xj ≥ 0 for all j ∈ N,
then this x maximises the original program (3.1). For all n (not necessarily n ≡ 1)




















1 1 0 0 . . . 0
1 1 1 0 . . . 0
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By Lemma 3.1 we have that x1 = 0. From the first row of Mn it then follows that
x2 is uniquely determined. But then the third row uniquely determines x3, and so
on. Hence, the solution for x is unique.





(0, q, 1, 0, q − 1, 2, 0, q − 2, 3, 0 . . . , 0, 2, q − 1, 0, 1, q, 0).
Next, we consider the case n ≡ 2, so let n = 3q + 2 with q ∈ N. Then the original






i∈N :i≡1,2 yi = 2,
∑
i∈N :i≡0 yi = 1,
yi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N.




if i ≡ 1, 2,
1
q
if i ≡ 0.





(0, q, 0, 1, q − 1, 0, 2, q − 2, 0 . . . , 0, q − 1, 1, 0, q, 0).
The solution of (3.1) in case G is a line is summarised in the following proposition.
Proposition 3.3 Let G ∈ GN be a line and let n = 3q + r with q ∈ N, r < 3. The
solution of (3.1) is given by the following three cases, depending on r (all equivalences
are mod 3):
a. r = 0. Then yi =
1
q
for all i ∈ N and f(G) = (1
q
)n.
b. r = 1. Then yi =
{ 1
q+1
if i ≡ 1,
1
q
if i ≡ 0, 2





c. r = 2. Then yi =
{ 1
q+1
if i ≡ 1, 2,
1
q
if i ≡ 0





The corresponding value of x is unique and determined by (3.3).
One natural question is whether for a given set N of nodes, the minimum value of
f(G) over all networks G on N is obtained when G is a line. This turns out not to
be the case, as is shown in the next example.
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Example 3.1 Consider N = {1, . . . , 7}. For the line network Gℓ on N , we use











Next, consider the network G depicted in Figure 2.
j j j j j
j
j
1 2 3 4 5
6
7
Figure 2: Network G
As can be easily seen, the maximum of (3.1) for this network is obtained in














Hence, f(Gℓ) > f(G). ⊳
A last interesting type of network that we consider is a cycle, defined as a graph
G consisting of the line and the extra link {n, 1}, as depicted for n = 5 in Figure 3.
Again, for all x ∈ SN , we have (3.2) for the corresponding optimal y. Contrary to
the line case, however, we can always find an x such that yi =
3
n
for all i ∈ N .
j j j j j1 2 3 4 5
Figure 3: Cycle network




i ∈ N , supported by the vector x ∈ SN with xj =
1
n
for all j ∈ N . The optimal value




4 Interpretation of the V L value
In this section, we provide an interpretation of the V L value for network games
studied in the previous paragraph. For this, we interpret the variables x and y in
program (3.1).
Assume that there is some noxious substance hidden within each of the nodes
in a network. A searcher wishes to find and uproot this substance in all nodes. He
does this by distributing some fixed amount of resources (normalised to 1) among
the several nodes.
It is assumed that the probability of finding and uprooting the substance which
is located at some particular node, over a small time interval, equals the amount of
resources placed at that node and at all adjacent nodes. The probability of finding
the substance at any one node is independent of what happens at any of the other
nodes. It is necessary, however, to destroy all of the substance within a small time
interval; otherwise, if any substance survives at any of the nodes, it can reproduce
and will be able to reoccupy all of the nodes. Thus, if the process does not end, it
begins anew at each time interval.
Assume that the searcher assigns resources equal to xi ≥ 0 at node i ∈ N and
that in total he has one unit of this resource available, so
∑
i∈N xi = 1. Then the




Since it is necessary to locate the substance at all n nodes simultaneously (and
these probabilities are independent by assumption) we find that the searcher must







xj ] subject to the
constraint that the quantities xj must be non-negative and add to 1. In this way
we are faced with the maximisation problem given by (3.1). Hence, the V L value
for network games studied in the previous section is the resource allocation that
maximises the probability of uprooting the noxious substance.
A different problem, which will be analysed in the next section, is in terms of
terrorists. Instead of a noxious substance located within all nodes, a single terrorist
hides himself in one particular node. The objective now is to maximise the prob-
ability of finding this terrorist before he carries out an attack. Assuming that the
terrorist chooses his hiding location intelligently (ie, minimising the probability of
being found), this problem can be described in terms of a matrix game. So, in-
stead of maximising the product of the finding probabilities yi, the searcher has to
10
maximise their minimum.
5 A relation with optimal strategies in matrix
games
For a network G ∈ GN , we denote by AG the N × N adjacency matrix of G, so AG
is a symmetric matrix with
AGij =
{
1 if {i, j} ∈ G,
0 if {i, j} /∈ G.
This matrix AG gives rise to a matrix game3, where both players’ strategy space is
SN .
This matrix game describes the terrorist search mentioned in the previous section.
Both player 1 (the searcher) and player 2 (the terrorist) place probabilities on the
nodes. The searcher does this in such a way that he maximises his probability (given
the terrorist’s strategy choice) of ending up in a “1”, ie, of finishing at the terrorist’s
or adjacent node. The terrorist’s objective is to evade the searcher and maximise
the probability of ending up in a “0”.
Player 1’s set of optimal strategies in the matrix game AG is defined by
O1(A







In this section, we study the relationship between the V L value for the special types
of graphs considered in Section 3 and player 1’s optimal strategies in the matrix
games arising from the corresponding adjacency matrices.
If i ∈ N is such that RG(i) = N , then the row corresponding to i in the adjacency
matrix AG contains only ones. It is immediately clear that then the vector x ∈ SN
with xi = 1 and xj = 0 for all j ∈ N\{i} is an optimal strategy for player 1 in the
matrix game AG.
Proposition 5.1 Let G ∈ GN be a network such that there is an i ∈ N with RG(i) =
N . Then for the vector x ∈ SN with xi = 1 and xj = 0 for all j ∈ N\{i} we have
x ∈ O1(A
G).
3Bapat and Tijs (1996) study another associated matrix game, in which player 1 puts proba-
bilities on the nodes and player 2 puts probabilities on the edges.
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So, for a star graph and a complete graph, finding an x ∈ SN that maximises (3.1)
boils down to finding an optimal strategy for player 1 in the associated matrix game
AG. Also for cycle networks, this phenomenon is immediate.




i ∈ N is an element of O1(A
G).
For line networks, the V L value is also an optimal strategy for player 1, as is shown
in the following proposition.
Proposition 5.3 Let G ∈ GN be a line and let x be the optimal vector as given in
Proposition 3.3. Then x ∈ O1(A
G).
Proof: Let n = 3q + r with q ∈ N, r < 3. We first prove the statement for r = 1.




























where (5.2) follows from the observation that the minimum of the numbers
∑
j∈RG(i)
x′j cannot exceed their average.





































Apparently, in case the graph is a star, line or cycle, the optimal searching strategies
for finding the noxious substance and the terrorist are the same. In general, however,
the shape of the graph does make a difference, as is shown in the following example.
Example 5.1 Consider the network G depicted in Figure 4. The optimal x ∈ SN




, 0). This vector, however, is not an optimal strategy
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